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Abstract
After nearly 30 years in power, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s decision to stand down on the 19th March 2019 as 
president of Kazakhstan took many observers by surprise. The former prime minister and speaker of the 
Kazakh Senate, Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev, took up the post of acting president as constitutionally desig-
nated, and then won an extraordinary presidential election in June 2019, which was marred by opposition 
protest demanding fairer elections and political reform. But the transition is one in which little has changed 
in the short to medium-term. Nazarbayev still holds power through a series of extra-constitutional and con-
stitutional positions and his informal power and influence is all encompassing. Moreover, Tokayev is com-
mitted to maintaining Nazarbayev’s policies, especially as they pertain to Kazakh–Russian relations and 
the broader foreign policy agenda of ‘multi-vectorism’. Within that agenda, however, there remain signif-
icant tensions in Kazakh–Russian relations, especially as they relate to questions of security and Russian 
soft-power. One important legacy of the Kazakh model of presidential transition is the extent to which it 
represents an exemplar for other post-Soviet authoritarian leaders to follow whereby they give up the office 
of president, but not power.
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The Nazarbayev–Tokayev Transition: 
Stability and Continuity
The clearest thing to note about Kazakhstan’s tran-
sition from Nazarbayev to Tokayev is that very little 
has changed or will change in the short to medium-
term. Nazarbayev may have left the presidency but he 
has not left power. Nazarbayev continues to hold the 
title of Elbasi, leader of the nation, remains head of the 
Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland) party, is the lifelong 
head of the National Security Council, he still represents 
Kazakhstan on the world stage, and continues to pos-
sess far reaching powers to appoint ministers and lead-
ing state officials.1 Nazarbayev’s position is much like 
that of the Roman Emperors as described by Edward 
Gibbon: ‘although the sovereign of Rome, in compliance 
with an obsolete prejudice, abstained from the name of 
the King, he possessed the full measure of regal power’.2
If stability and continuity are the bywords of the 
transition, then what was the purpose of the transition? 
Nazarbayev had been seeking to move on from the pres-
idency for some time; his age and securing his legacy the 
principle reasons for doing so. There had been rumours 
that the transition had been planned for 2014, but 
had been scuppered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
Nazarbayev could not move on with such potential insta-
bility and conflict in a nearby region. Kazakhstan shares 
a 6800-kilometre border with Russia and has a size-
able ethnic Russian population who are citizens of the 
Kazakh state. There were fears that should Nazarbayev 
resign in 2014 Kazakhstan could be next in line to see 
its territorial integrity questioned by Russian great power 
play in the region. The death of long-serving Uzbek pres-
ident Islam Karimov in 2016 sharpened Nazarbayev’s 
focus on his mortality and the need to secure his legacy 
as Kazakhstan’s great national leader, a modern-day Ata-
türk. Slowly the plan was put in place. In 2017, the pres-
ident went on TV to announce constitutional reform 
which sought to divest powers from the president to 
the prime minister and parliament, while Nazarbayev’s 
position was to be refashioned as the ‘supreme arbiter’ 
overseeing defence, security and foreign policy.3 A year 
later in March 2018 legislation was passed through the 
Mazhilis (parliament), which made Nazarbayev chair-
man of Kazakhstan’s National Security Council for life 
and also elevated the body from an advisory to a con-
stitutional status.4 The on-going crackdown of political 
opposition, independent media, journalists and social 
media sites during this time created a sterile political 
environment, which sought to minimise any threat to 
political stability while the Nazarbayev regime enacted 
its carefully choregraphed transition plan that unfolded 
with Nazarbayev’s resignation live on TV on the eve-
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ning of 19th March 2019 and Tokayev taking the oath 
of office the following day. Arguably, Nazarbayev and 
Tokayev are operating in a loose tandem. Tokayev takes 
responsibility for domestic economic and social policy, 
while Nazarbayev floats above domestic politics as the 
‘supreme arbiter’, directing broader state strategy as it per-
tains to the international sphere, and to some extent the 
domestic sphere too. Effectively, Nazarbayev has abdi-
cated himself from frontline responsibility for Kazakh-
stan’s economic and social problems. Instead he is bath-
ing in the spotlight of the international stage, promoting 
Kazakhstan’s economic and political interests abroad.
Tokayev and the Multi-Vector Foreign Policy
Tokayev was the rational choice to replace Nazarbayev. 
He lacks charisma, is dependable and safe. With Tokayev 
there would be no ruptures, no surprises and no quick 
move towards democratic reform which would jeopar-
dise Nazarbayev’s legacy of stability or relations with 
Russia. The meagre tilt towards political reform Tokayev 
has promised regarding the registration of political 
parties and the right to free public assembly attest to the 
fact he is not going to rock the boat.5 Such reforms rep-
resent only an incremental effort to liberalise the politics 
of the country. Thus, Tokayev represents not a coloured 
revolution, but rather a ‘beige transition’. And Tokayev, 
as Nazarbayev’s replacement, is perhaps the best-case 
scenario for the interests of the Russian government. 
The rumours that Nazarbayev had even consulted with 
Putin over his plans for succession were somewhat con-
firmed by the official reporting of a telephone conversa-
tion between the two leaders prior to Nazarbayev’s res-
ignation.6 Tokayev was a known quantity to Russian 
officials. His long career in Kazakhstani politics, serving 
as Foreign Minister (twice), Prime Minister, Chairman 
of the Kazakh Senate (twice) as well as Director-Gen-
eral of the United Nations Office at Geneva, means he 
had experience of working with Russian foreign policy 
makers. From the outset, the new president, Tokayev, 
was viewed from the perspective of senior Russian pol-
iticians as a ‘safe pair of hands’ and someone ‘who will 
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continue the course laid down by the first president of 
Kazakhstan’.7 Indeed, Tokayev’s first international visit 
two weeks after taking up the reins of the presidency 
was to Moscow to meet with Putin. At the meeting 
Tokayev declared that he was committed to guarantee-
ing ‘the continuity of the policy of the First President 
of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, as well as to con-
tinue working on the comprehensive and active develop-
ment of Kazakhstan–Russian cooperation’.8
It should be no surprise that Tokayev will continue 
to follow Nazarbayev’s so-called ‘multi-vector’ for-
eign policy whereby Kazakhstan seeks to balance ties 
with Russia and China (and to some extent the US and 
Europe) underpinned by a drive to integrate Kazakhstan 
into global and regional markets.9 Aside from Nazar-
bayev’s continued presence and oversight of Kazakh-
stan’s foreign policy, Tokayev was largely responsible 
for drawing up the ‘multi-vector’ policy during his first 
stint as Foreign Minister from 1994 to 1999 and the idea 
remains fundamental to Kazakhstan’s current Foreign 
Policy Concept.10 From the outset of taking up the pres-
idency, Tokayev has been keen to reassure Russian offi-
cials that Russia remains at the heart of Kazakhstan’s 
‘multi-vector’ foreign policy. In his first speech as presi-
dent Tokayev noted that he would give additional impe-
tus to the development of bilateral cooperation between 
Russia and Kazakhstan.11 When he met with Putin in 
April Tokayev declared that he would do everything to 
reinforce the ties between Russia and Kazakhstan and 
emphasised the ‘special relationship’ between the two 
countries.12 In his speech at the Valdai Discussion Club 
in Sochi in October 2019, Tokayev lavishly praised Rus-
sia as a ‘great state’ and that ‘in the modern world no key 
problem, be it global or regional, can be solved without 
the constructive participation of Russia’.13
Such an approach by Tokyaev is rational given 
Kazakhstan’s geographic, historical, economic and cul-
tural ties with Russia. Sharing such a long contiguous 
border and with 4 million ethnic Russians living in 
Kazakhstan, Tokayev (and Nazarbayev) will continue 
to hold close to Russia in order to ‘prevent all possible 
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threats from the Russian side’.14 No doubt Russia’s swal-
lowing up of Crimea and the on-going conflict in Don-
bass continues to loom large in Kazakh foreign policy 
thinking in terms of any Russian threat to its security 
and territorial sovereignty. It perhaps explains Tokayev’s 
remarks in December 2019 that in Kazakhstan they 
don’t consider what happened to Crimea as annexation.15 
The Tokayev–Nazarbayev tandem is unlikely to imbal-
ance relations with Russia. Thus, the duo will ensure 
Kazakhstan remains a key ally, partner and supporter 
of Russia. The strategy has produced some immediate 
returns. Trade between the two countries continues to 
grow, reaching $13.6 billion for the first 9 months of 
2019, an increase of $2 billon from 2018,16 driven partly 
by both countries’ membership of the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union, an organisation in which Russia dom-
inates.17 But Russia has also signalled a willingness to 
build a nuclear power plant in the Almaty region, some-
thing Kazakh officials have long sought.
Russian–Kazakhstan Foreign Policy 
Tensions
Nevertheless, any assessment of Russia–Kazakhstan rela-
tions in this period of transition needs to consider points 
of on-going tension,18 and the fact that the relationship 
is not based simply on Kazakhstan slavishly following 
the will of Russian interests.19 First among these ten-
sions is the extent to which Russian influence brings into 
question Kazakhstani sovereignty. This appears notably 
in material and security terms by way of the large Rus-
sian ethnic minority in Kazakhstan. The Russian ethnic 
minority, while gradually decreasing, continues to pro-
vide Russia with leverage over Kazakhstan in terms of 
questions of security.20 Second, there have been concerns 
in Astana, and the broader public sphere in Kazakhstan, 
regarding Russia’s broader cultural influence. Russian-
language broadcast and written media is perceived as 
dominating Kazakhstan’s. media space. Local journal-
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16 Startsev, O. (2019) ‘Kursom elbasy’, Versia, 2 December. Accessed 20 January
17 Bhutia, S. (2019) ‘Russia dominates Eurasian Union trade. Here are the numbers’ Eurasianet, 18 October. Accessed 22 January 2020
18 Kassenova, N. (2019) ‘Relations with Russia and China’ in Kazakhstan Tested by Transition. Chatham House Report. London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs.
19 Laruelle, M. Royce, D. and Beyssembayev, S. (2019) ‘Untangling the puzzle of “Russia’s influence” in Kazakhstan, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 60, (2): 211–243.
20 Kassenova, N. (2019) ‘Relations with Russia and China’ in Kazakhstan Tested by Transition. Chatham House Report. London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs., p. 89.
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25 Kassenova, N. (2019) ‘Relations with Russia and China’ in Kazakhstan Tested by Transition. Chatham House Report. London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, p. 94.
ist Sergei Duvanov has claimed Russian media resem-
bles a ‘fifth column’, which Kazakhstanis are ‘forced to 
eat’.21 Russian media in Kazakhstan is largely loyal to 
Astana and the Nazarbayev regime, but it tends to dis-
seminate an anti-Western position, something Nargis 
Kassenova suggests sits uneasily with Astana’s commit-
ment to ‘multi-vectorism’.22 When Kazakhstan is seeking 
to face all directions and present an outward facing pos-
ture to other major world powers, a domestic media space 
dominated by Russian anti-Western polemics is a source 
of frustration to Kazakhstani officials. Countering Rus-
sian soft power has entailed a more robust Kazakhstani-
zation of the state via discursive nation-building efforts 
through TV programmes and films,23 a law extend-
ing the amount of Television programmes which are 
required to be nationally produced,24 the further promo-
tion of the Kazakh language (and English too) and the 
long-promised shift from a Cyrillic to a Latin alphabet.
In the short to medium term, the Tokayev–Nazar-
bayev tandem will continue to pursue a dual strategy 
of involvement in two integrative projects: The Eura-
sian Economic Union (EAEU) and China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). The EAEU had been a long-held 
dream of Nazarbayev’s, but the slow pace of its devel-
opment, and difficulties which are being faced in inte-
grating frameworks and regulations of very different 
economies, alongside Russia’s dominance and occa-
sional unilateral approach to decision-making within 
the organisation, will serve to be a base for future ten-
sions between Kazakhstan and Russia.25 In the mean-
time, Kazakhstan continues to build ties with China 
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
and through the investment it is receiving as a conse-
quence of BRI. Neither Kazakhstan’s participation in 
the SCO, nor BRI is likely to undermine Kazakhstani–
Russian relations. Russia adopts a more careful approach 
to relations with China than it does with Kazakhstan’s 
Western allies. Moreover, China does not present any 
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ideological or normative threat in Kazakhstan like US or 
European partners who are seeking to promote political 
reform. While greater Chinese investment is a boon to 
Kazakhstan’s growth prospects and further integration 
into the broader regional economy, it is also a source of 
domestic tension, with anti-Chinese attitudes on the rise 
in Kazakhstan. Largely this has been directed at Chinese 
workers in the oil industry, but there is also considerable 
public disquiet regarding the stories of ethnic Kazakhs 
being held in Chinese internment camps in Xinjiang.
It is important, however, to remember that Russia–
Kazakhstan relations are not just a one-way street. It 
is true that Russia is highly influential in Kazakhstan 
not least because of geographic, demographic and cul-
tural reasons, but also at the same time Russia needs 
Kazakhstan. Since relations with Ukraine are at an all-
time low, Russia needs a reliable supporter in the former 
Soviet Union. Kazakhstan is Russia’s number-one ally 
in the region. Thus, as much as Tokayev may feel the 
need to offer cloy words and sentiments from the out-
set of his presidency towards Russia and Putin, Russian 
policy makers would do well to keep the Kazakhs on-
side. Demographic and cultural shifts over the decades 
to come will see Russia’s soft power decrease in Kazakh-
stan. It will then become the economic and material 
benefits of Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia which 
will matter most. If they fail to materialise in sufficient 
number then Moscow could see Kazakhstani support 
for Russian interests and policy wither.
Concluding Remarks
In the short to medium term, the ‘beige transition’ from 
Nazarbayev to Tokayev changes little both domesti-
cally and internationally. At home, Tokayev is prom-
ising some modicum of political reform regarding the 
right to freedom of assembly and the ability for organ-
26 Isaacs, R. (2015) ‘The Routinization of Charisma in Central Asia: The cases of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’. Studies in Tran-
sition States and Societies, 7 (1): 58–76.
isations to register as political parties. But this does not 
provide the necessary radical changes required to trans-
form the authoritarian system in Kazakhstan. Moreover, 
Nazarbayev remains powerful and the key decision-
maker in terms of broader state strategy. Internationally, 
such limited domestic reform in Kazakhstan suits Mos-
cow. Kazakhstan will continue a foreign policy which is 
aimed at balancing the interests of Russia, China and 
other key players. But close ties with Russia and the 
Putin regime will remain sacrosanct for the meantime.
Perhaps the greatest significance of Nazarbayev’s 
half-departure is the new constitutional model it pro-
vides authoritarian leaders as they seek to leave office, but 
remain influential and ultimately in power. Such efforts 
have been described by scholars as a form of charismatic 
routinization.26 This is the process whereby political lead-
ership premised on the sheer magnetism, charisma and 
personality of a leader is transferred into the political 
institutions of the state. This is the model Nazarbayev 
is trying to pursue, but while ostensibly institutions like 
the presidency and parliament are formally supposed to 
hold power, in fact ultimate power resides informally in 
the personality of Nazarbayev and the extra-constitu-
tional positions he has created for himself as ‘leader of 
the nation’ and life chair of the National Security Coun-
cil. One can’t help but think the way in which Nazar-
bayev has managed to maintain influence and control 
in Kazakhstan despite leaving the office of president is 
influencing Putin’s recent proposals for constitutional 
change. Putin’s desire to establish a management struc-
ture for running the country in which he is less directly 
involved, but at the same time floating above it as the 
‘supreme arbiter’ are evidently inspired by the model put 
in place by Nazarbayev in 2019. This form of ‘author-
itarian diffusion’ will perhaps be the most significant 
legacy of Kazakhstan’s ‘beige transition’.
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